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Job Spells, Employer Spells, and Wage Returns to Tenure

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  • Devereux, Paul J.

    ()
    (University College Dublin)

  • Hart, Robert A.

    ()
    (University of Stirling)

  • Roberts, J. Elizabeth

    ()
    (University of Stirling)

Abstract

We show that the distinction between job spells and employer spells matters for returns to tenure. Employer spells encompass between-job wage movements linked to promotions or demotions while job spells don't. Using a 1% sample of the British workforce over the period 1975-2010, we find that a significant proportion of the return to employer tenure arises due to job changes within employer spells. Conditional on tenure with employer, the return to job tenure is negative. This suggests that any positive effects of job-specific human capital on wage growth within jobs are outweighed by the effects of job changes within firms.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 7384.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: May 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7384

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Keywords: job spells; employer spells; wage-tenure profiles;

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