Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Curse of Windfall Gains in a Non Renewable Resource Oligopoly

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hassan Benchekroun
  • Ngo Van Long

    ()

Abstract

We investigate the effect of stock discovery on the profits of non-identical oligopolists. We show that a uniform addition to all stocks could harm firms that are originally larger than average. One conclusion that could be drawn from the results is that a new technology that leads to more efficient exploitation of the available resource is not necessarily welcomed by all firms. On étudie les effets de la découverte des stocks de ressources sur les profits des firmes asymétriques. On montre que l’augmentation uniforme des stocks pour toutes les firmes pourrait désavantager celles qui sont initialement les plus grandes. On déduit que la découverte d’une nouvelle technologie qui permet une augmentation d’efficacité d’extraction pour toutes les firmes pourrait réduire le profit de certaines firmes.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2006s-10.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2006s-10.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 May 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-10

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2020 rue University, 25e étage, Montréal, Quéc, H3A 2A5
Phone: (514) 985-4000
Fax: (514) 985-4039
Email:
Web page: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: non-renewable resource; oligopoly; stock discovery; découverte des stocks; oligopole; ressources naturelles;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Benchekroun, Hassan, 2003. "Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 214-239, August.
  2. Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy, 1992. "The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 155-90, April.
  3. Benchekroun, Hassan & Van Long, Ngo, 2002. "Transboundary Fishery: A Differential Game Model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(274), pages 207-21, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Fujiwara, Kenji, 2011. "Losses from competition in a dynamic game model of a renewable resource oligopoly," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-11, January.
  2. Hartwick, John M. & Brolley, Michael, 2008. "The quadratic oil extraction oligopoly," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 568-577, December.
  3. Halkos, George & Papageorgiou, George, 2012. "Simple taxation schemes on non–renewable resources extraction," MPRA Paper 40945, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.