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Losses from competition in a dynamic game model of a renewable resource oligopoly

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  • Fujiwara, Kenji

Abstract

This article develops a dynamic game model of an asymmetric oligopoly with a renewable resource to reconsider welfare effects of increases in the number of firms. We show that increasing not only the number of inefficient firms but also that of efficient firms reduces welfare, which sharply contrasts to a static outcome. It is discussed that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies plays a decisive role in this finding.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.

Volume (Year): 33 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-11

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Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:33:y:2011:i:1:p:1-11

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569

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Keywords: Differential game Asymmetric oligopoly Feedback strategy;

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References

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  1. Long, Ngo Van & Wang, Shengzu, 2009. "Resource-grabbing by status-conscious agents," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 39-50, May.
  2. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-31, December.
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  4. Benchekroun, Hassan & Van Long, Ngo, 2002. "Transboundary Fishery: A Differential Game Model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(274), pages 207-21, May.
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  6. Shimomura, Koji, 1991. "The feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 317-338, April.
  7. Jun-ichi Itaya & Koji Shimomura, 1999. "A Dynamic Conjectural Variations Model in the Private Provision of Public Goods: a Differential Game Approach," Discussion Paper Series 104, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  8. Benchekroun, Hassan, 2003. "Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 214-239, August.
  9. James A. Brander & M. Scott Taylor, 1997. "International Trade and Open-Access Renewable Resources: The Small Open Economy Case," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(3), pages 526-52, August.
  10. BENCHEKROUN, Hassan, 2005. "The Double Curse of a Common Property Productive Asset Oligopoly," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 02-2005, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  11. Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 2006. "The Curse of Windfall Gains in a Non Renewable Resource Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-10, CIRANO.
  12. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
  13. Tsutsui, Shunichi & Mino, Kazuo, 1990. "Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 136-161, October.
  14. Erwin Bulte & Henk Folmer & Wim Heijman, 1995. "Open access, common property and scarcity rent in fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(4), pages 309-320, December.
  15. Rubio, Santiago J. & Casino, Begona, 2002. "A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 251-261, June.
  16. Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-64, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ben Jebli, Mehdi & Ben Youssef, Slim, 2012. "Timing of adoption of clean technologies, transboundary pollution and international trade," MPRA Paper 42467, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Zhang Wei-Bin, 2011. "Economic Growth And Dynamics Of Renewable Resource With Housing, Agricultural And Resource Land Use," Studies in Business and Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 6(2), pages 151-174, August.
  3. Luca Lambertini & Andrea Mantovani, 2013. "Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, voracity and exhaustion," Working Papers 2013/26, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  4. Naoto Jinji, 2013. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly: A Generalized Result," Discussion papers e-12-011, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.
  5. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
  6. Wei-Bin ZHANG, 2014. "Human Capital, Wealth, and Renewable Resources," Expert Journal of Economics, Sprint Investify, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20.

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