Losses from competition in a dynamic game model of a renewable resource oligopoly
AbstractThis article develops a dynamic game model of an asymmetric oligopoly with a renewable resource to reconsider welfare effects of increases in the number of firms. We show that increasing not only the number of inefficient firms but also that of efficient firms reduces welfare, which sharply contrasts to a static outcome. It is discussed that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies plays a decisive role in this finding.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.
Volume (Year): 33 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569
Differential game Asymmetric oligopoly Feedback strategy;
Other versions of this item:
- Kenji Fujiwara, 2010. "Losses from competition in a dynamic game model of a renewable resource oligopoly," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University 51, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Apr 2010.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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