Duopoly can be more anti-competitive than monopoly
AbstractWe prove two results on feedback equilibria under dynamic renewable resource duopoly. The linear feedback output is smallest, which sharply contrasts to the existing literature where it is largest. Moreover, prices in two feedback equilibria are higher than under monopoly.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 101 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Dynamic duopoly Renewable resource Feedback strategies;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Benchekroun, Hassan, 2008.
"Comparative dynamics in a productive asset oligopoly,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 237-261, January.
- BENCHEKROUN, Hassan, 2005. "The Double Curse of a Common Property Productive Asset Oligopoly," Cahiers de recherche 02-2005, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-64, September.
- Shimomura, Koji, 1991. "The feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 317-338, April.
- Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-31, December.
- Rubio, Santiago J. & Casino, Begona, 2002. "A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 251-261, June.
- Benchekroun, Hassan & Van Long, Ngo, 2002. "Transboundary Fishery: A Differential Game Model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(274), pages 207-21, May.
- Itaya, Jun-ichi & Shimomura, Koji, 2001.
"A dynamic conjectural variations model in the private provision of public goods: a differential game approach,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 153-172, July.
- Jun-ichi Itaya & Koji Shimomura, 1999. "A Dynamic Conjectural Variations Model in the Private Provision of Public Goods: a Differential Game Approach," Discussion Paper Series 104, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Gerhard Sorger, 2005. "A dynamic common property resource problem with amenity value and extraction costs," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 3-19.
- Colin Rowat, 2005.
"Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game,"
GE, Growth, Math methods
- Rowat, Colin, 2007. "Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3179-3202, October.
- Colin Rowat, 2005. "Non-Linear Strategies in a Linear Quadratic Differential Game," Discussion Papers 05-05, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Benchekroun, Hassan, 2003. "Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 214-239, August.
- Dockner, Engelbert J. & Sorger, Gerhard, 1996. "Existence and Properties of Equilibria for a Dynamic Game on Productive Assets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 209-227, October.
- Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
- Tsutsui, Shunichi & Mino, Kazuo, 1990. "Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 136-161, October.
- L. Lambertini & A. Mantovani, 2013.
"Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, voracity and exhaustion,"
wp890, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Luca Lambertini & Andrea Mantovani, 2013. "Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, voracity and exhaustion," Working Papers 2013/26, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Luca Lambertini & Andrea Mantovani, 2013. "Feedback Equilibria in a Dynamic Renewable Resource Oligopoly: Pre-Emption, Voracity and Exhaustion," Working Paper Series 56_13, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
- Marc Deschamps, 2013. "Pourquoi des politiques de concurrence ?," GREDEG Working Papers 2013-23, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Économie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.