Transboundary Fishery: A Differential Game Model
AbstractWe consider a differential game between two players, where one player has the first-mover advantage. We compare the equilibrium of this model with the one generated by a conventional symmetric model. The existence of a first mover results in more conservationist exploitation in the aggregate. We also consider the implication of departures from the equilibrium. If the leader can commit to decrease its fishing effort over a finite interval of time, then the follower may respond by increasing, or decreasing, its catch rate, depending on the length of the commitment period. Copyright 2002 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 69 (2002)
Issue (Month): 274 (May)
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