Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish
AbstractWarm-glow refers to other-serving behavior that is valuable for the actor per se, apart from its social implications. We provide axiomatic foundations for warm-glow by viewing it as a form of preference for larger choice sets, in the sense of the literature on freedom of choice. Specically, an individual who experiences warm-glow prefers the freedom to be sel sh: she values the availability of sel sh options even if she plans to act unsel shly. Our theory also provides foundations for empirically distinguishing between warm-glow and other motivations for prosocial behavior. The implied choice behavior subsumes Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Andreoni (1990).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0171.
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2011
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More information through EDIRC
Altruism; Warm-Glow; Freedom of Choice; Philanthropy; Charitable Giving; Public Goods;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-04-03 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2012-04-03 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-04-03 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PUB-2012-04-03 (Public Finance)
- NEP-SOC-2012-04-03 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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