Voter Turnout and Political Rents
AbstractIs the decline in voter turnout an indicator of a worse health of a representative democracy? We build a simple probabilistic-voting model with endogenous turnout to address this question. We ?nd that a lower turnout caused by a higher cost of voting implies higher political rents. Contrarily, a lower turnout caused by a higher ideological mobility of voters or by a lower expressive bene?t of voting implies lower political rents. If voters have a civic-duty motive to vote which depends on the level of rents, multiple equilibria (a high-rents and a low-rents) can arise.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 294.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
voter turnout; political rents; electoral competition.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-03-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MAC-2013-03-09 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2013-03-09 (Positive Political Economics)
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