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An Alternative Explanation of the Chance of Casting a Pivotal Vote

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  • Dan Usher

    ()
    (Queen`s University)

Abstract

This paper is about a model of uncertainty in voting that allows for a schedule of people`s preferences for one party over another, that gives rise to a chance of casting a pivotal vote which is small but not, as often supposed, infinitesimal, that is not inconsistent with evidence about the chance of casting a pivotal vote and that preserves a role for self-interest, along with a duty to vote, in the decision whether to vote or abstain.

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File URL: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1238.pdf
File Function: First version 2011
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1238.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1238

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Keywords: Pivital voting; Duty to vote; compulsory voting;

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  1. Colin M. Campbell, 1999. "Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1199-1217, December.
  2. Tilman Börgers, 2001. "Costly Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000232, David K. Levine.
  3. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  4. Chamberlain, Gary & Rothschild, Michael, 1981. "A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 152-162, August.
  5. Aaron Edlin & Andrew Gelman & Noah Kaplan, 2007. "Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others," NBER Working Papers 13562, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Bafumi, Joseph, 2002. "Standard Voting Power Indexes Don't Work: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 1133, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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