An Alternative Explanation of the Chance of Casting a Pivotal Vote
AbstractThis paper is about a model of uncertainty in voting that allows for a schedule of people`s preferences for one party over another, that gives rise to a chance of casting a pivotal vote which is small but not, as often supposed, infinitesimal, that is not inconsistent with evidence about the chance of casting a pivotal vote and that preserves a role for self-interest, along with a duty to vote, in the decision whether to vote or abstain.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1238.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Pivital voting; Duty to vote; compulsory voting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-05-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-05-29 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Bafumi, Joseph, 2002. "Standard Voting Power Indexes Don't Work: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 1133, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Tilman Borgers, 2004.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March.
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- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995.
"A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
1995-01, McMaster University.
- Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
- Aaron Edlin & Andrew Gelman & Noah Kaplan, 2007. "Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others," NBER Working Papers 13562, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Colin M. Campbell, 1999. "Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1199-1217, December.
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