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Inter-Regional Trade and Lobbying

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Author Info
Sergei Guriev (New Economic School (NES), Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR))
Evgeny Yakovlev (University of California, Berkeley)
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya () (New Economic School (NES), Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR))

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Abstract

In a federation, local policies with inter-regional spillovers depend on the extent and the nature of local capture. Local lobbyists who have multi-regional scope internalize inter-jurisdictional externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests in a single region. In particular, multi-regional industrial groups lobby for lower interregional trade barriers than local industrial lobbies. The results are based on a simple model, case-study evidence, and econometric analysis of micro-level panel data from Russia. Controlling for firm-level fixed effects, the performance of firms increases with an increase in the number of neighboring regions captured by multiregional groups. The paper has implications for international trade: lobbying by multinationals should lead to lower protectionism compared to lobbying by national corporations.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0100.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0100

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor'S Edge: Distortions And Incremental Reform In The People'S Republic Of China," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1091-1135, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Konstantin Sonin, 2003. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," Working Papers w0022, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Sandra Poncet, 2004. "A Fragmented China," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-103/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China," NBER Working Papers 7828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Irina Slinko & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," Economics Working Papers 0046, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
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