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Risk Taking, Limited Liability and the Competition of Bank Regulators

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Author Info
Hans-Werner Sinn ()

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Abstract

Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these constraints may not survive in systems competition, as systems competition is likely to suffer from the same type of information asymmetry which induced the private market failure and which brought in the government in the first place (Selection Principle). As national solvency regulation creates a positive international policy externality on foreign lenders of domestic banks, there will be an undersupply of such regulation. This may explain why Asian banks were undercapitalised and took excessive risks before the banking crisis emerged.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 603.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_603

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Related research
Keywords: systems competition; Basel II; banking with limited liability and Lemon bonds;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Edward J. Kane, 2000. "Capital Movements, Banking Insolvency, and Silent Runs in the Asian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 7514, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Christian Gollier & Pierre-François Koehl & Jean-CharlesRochet, 1996. "Risk-Taking Behavior with Limited Liability and Risk Aversion," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-13, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rüdiger Dornbusch, 2002. "The New International Architecture," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 59(3), pages 296-, August.
    Other versions:
  4. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1982. "Kinked utility and the demand for human wealth and liability insurance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 149-162. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Robert Dekle & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2001. "Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises: Theory and Empirical Evidence from East Asia," NBER Working Papers 8322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Dow, Sheila C, 1996. "Why the Banking System Should Be Regulated," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 698-707, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Modigliani, Franco, 1982. " Debt, Dividend Policy, Taxes, Inflation and Market Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 255-73, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2000. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-1999," NBER Working Papers 7715, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bester,Helmut Hellwig,Martin, 1987. "Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing: An overview of the issues," Discussion Paper Serie A 125, University of Bonn, Germany.
  11. Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti & Nouriel Roubini, 1998. "What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis? Part II: The Policy Debate," NBER Working Papers 6834, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1997. "The selection principle and market failure in systems competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 247-274, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1992. "Capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1137-1170, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Blum, Jurg & Hellwig, Martin, 1995. "The macroeconomic implications of capital adequacy requirements for banks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 739-749, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Miller, Merton H, 1977. "Debt and Taxes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 261-75, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Kane, Edward J., 2000. "Capital movements, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 153-175, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Shuyun May Li, 2008. "Costly External Finance, Reallocation, and Aggregate Productivity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1044, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  2. Daniel C. L. Hardy, 2006. "Regulatory Capture in Banking," IMF Working Papers 06/34, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2001. "The New Systems Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision : The European Case," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-62, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.

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