Appropriating the Commons A Theoretical Explanation
AbstractIn this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 474.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Common pool resources; experiments; fairness; reciprocity; game theory; fairness models;
Other versions of this item:
- Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation," IEW - Working Papers 055, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2925, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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