Why Can’t a Woman Bid More Like a Man?
AbstractWe find robust gender differences in bidding behavior in sealed bid auctions with independent and private valuations in a laboratory setting. In particular, we find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in the likelihood of dominant strategy play in the second-price auction. At a biological level, in the first-price auction, women during menstruation, when the estrogen level is lowest, do not bid differently from men. The gender difference in the first-price auction is driven by women during other phases of the menstrual cycle when they have higher estrogen levels.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp275.
Date of creation: Sep 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 882, Politickych veznu 7, 111 21 Praha 1
Phone: (+420) 224 005 123
Fax: (+420) 224 005 333
Web page: http://www.cerge-ei.cz
More information through EDIRC
Gender; menstrual cycle; auction.;
Other versions of this item:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2005-11-05 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2005-11-05 (Experimental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Andrea Ichino & Enrico Moretti, 2009.
"Biological Gender Differences, Absenteeism, and the Earnings Gap,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 183-218, January.
- Andrea Ichino & Enrico Moretti, 2006. "Biological Gender Differences, Absenteeism and the Earning Gap," NBER Working Papers 12369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ichino, Andrea & Moretti, Enrico, 2006. "Biological Gender Differences, Absenteeism and the Earning Gap," CEPR Discussion Papers 5785, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ichino, Andrea & Moretti, Enrico, 2006. "Biological Gender Differences, Absenteeism and the Earning Gap," IZA Discussion Papers 2207, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Buser, Thomas, 2012. "The impact of the menstrual cycle and hormonal contraceptives on competitiveness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 1-10.
- Claudia Goldin, 1990.
"Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women,"
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number gold90-1.
- Goldin, Claudia, 1992. "Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195072709.
- Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, 2009. "Gender Differences in Preferences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 448-74, June.
- Thomas Buser, 2011.
"Hormones and Social Preferences,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
11-046/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Buser, Thomas, 2012. "Digit ratios, the menstrual cycle and social preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 457-470.
- Chen, Yan & Katuscak, Peter & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2007. "Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: Theory and experiments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 513-535, September.
- E. Elisabet RutstrÃm, 1998. "Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 427-441.
- Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, 2005.
"Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete too Much?,"
04-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, 2007. "Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(3), pages 1067-1101, 08.
- Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, 2005. "Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?," NBER Working Papers 11474, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Burkhard Schipper, 2012. "Sex Hormones and Competitive Bidding," Working Papers 128, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Marco Casari & John C. Ham & John H. Kagel, 2007.
"Selection Bias, Demographic Effects, and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1278-1304, September.
- Marco Casari & John C. Ham & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments," Staff Reports 213, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979.
UCLA Economics Working Papers
152, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Uri Gneezy & Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Performance In Competitive Environments: Gender Differences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 1049-1074, August.
- Mariesa A. Herrmann & Jonah E. Rockoff, 2012. "Does Menstruation Explain Gender Gaps in Work Absenteeism?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 47(2), pages 493-508.
- Jianakoplos, Nancy Ammon & Bernasek, Alexandra, 1998. "Are Women More Risk Averse?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 620-30, October.
- Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2004.
"Gender and Competition at a Young Age,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 377-381, May.
- Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
- Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jana Koudelkova).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.