Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Strategy Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest
AbstractThe aim of this investigation is to display how the use of classroom experiments may be a good pedagogical tool to teach the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. The basic game for our purposes is a repeated version of the Beauty Contest Game (BCG), a simple guessing game whose repetition lets students react to other players’ choices and to converge iteratively to the equilibrium solution. We performed this experiment with undergraduate students without any previous knowledge about game theory. After four rounds, we observed in all groups a clear decreasing tendency in the average chosen number. So, our findings prove that, by playing a repeated BCG, students quickly learn how to reach the NE solution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2003/47.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Classroom Experiments; Beauty Contest Game; Teaching; Nash Equilibrium.;
Other versions of this item:
- Virtudes Alba-Fernández & Pablo Brañas-Garza & Francisca Jiménez-Jiménez & Javier Rodero-Cosano, 2004. "Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest," IESA Working Papers Series 0413, Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research.
- A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
- C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-01-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2004-01-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2004-01-25 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2004-01-25 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Virtudes Alba-Fernández & Pablo Brañas-Garza & Francisca Jiménez-Jiménez & Javier Rodero-Cosano, 2004.
"Communication, coordination and competition in the beauty contest game: Eleven classroom experiments,"
IESA Working Papers Series
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- Virtudes Alba Fernández & Pablo Brañas-Garza & Francisca Jiménez Jiménez & Javier Rodero Cosano, 2004. "Communication, coordination and competition in the beauty contest game: Eleven classroom experiments," ThE Papers 04/-1, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
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