Communication, coordination and competition in the beauty contest game: Eleven classroom experiments
AbstractThis paper introduces some new features in the standard experimental design of the beauty contest in order to allow communication among participants. With that aim, we use the mode instead of the mean and non-rival payoffs. This design encourages students to communicate their guessed number, with a higher probability if subjects know the 0 Nash equilibrium. The lack of communication can only be explained by subjects endowed with competitive other-regarding preferences. Experiments are run in 11 classrooms ranging from 11 to 60 students in size. Participants are given at least one week to submit their guesses and a questionnaire explaining their choice. Results indicate that: i) communication induces coordination in the responses, ii) communication does not guarantee any improvement in the average reasoning level, iii) there exist significative differences according to classroom size and duration of degree.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research in its series IESA Working Papers Series with number 0416.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Beauty Contest Games; Experiments; Communication; Coordination; Competition; Meta-analysis;
Other versions of this item:
- Virtudes Alba Fernández & Pablo Brañas-Garza & Francisca Jiménez Jiménez & Javier Rodero Cosano, 2004. "Communication, coordination and competition in the beauty contest game: Eleven classroom experiments," ThE Papers 04/-1, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
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