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Estimating Coke and Pepsi's price and advertising strategies

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  • Golan, Amos
  • Karp, Larry
  • Perloff, Jeffrey M.

Abstract

A semi-parametric, information-based estimator is used to estimate strategies in prices and advertising for Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. Separate strategies for each firm are estimated with and without restrictions from game theory. These information/entropy estimators are consistent, are efficient, and do not require distributional assumptions. These estimates are used to test theories about the strategies of firms and to see how changes in incomes or factor prices affect these strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series with number qt6rf8j6m4.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt6rf8j6m4

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Keywords: game theory; maximum entropy estimation; oligopoly; marketing;

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References

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  1. Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Reiss, Peter C., 1991. "Empirical models of discrete games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1-2), pages 57-81.
  2. Gary M. Erickson, 1992. "Empirical Analysis of Closed-Loop Duopoly Advertising Strategies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(12), pages 1732-1749, December.
  3. Karp, Larry S & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1989. "Dynamic Oligopoly in the Rice Export Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 71(3), pages 462-70, August.
  4. Gasmi, F. & Vuong, Q.H., 1988. "An Econometric Analysis Of Some Duopolistic Games In Prices And Advertising," Papers m8903, Southern California - Department of Economics.
  5. Bresnahan, Timothy F., 1989. "Empirical studies of industries with market power," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 17, pages 1011-1057 Elsevier.
  6. Gasmi, F & Laffont, J J & Vuong, Q, 1992. "Econometric Analysis of Collusive Behavior in a Soft-Drink Market," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 277-311, Summer.
  7. Golan, Amos & Judge, George G. & Miller, Douglas, 1996. "Maximum Entropy Econometrics," Staff General Research Papers 1488, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  8. Roberts, M.J. & Samuelson, L., 1988. "An Empirical Analysis Of Dynamic, Non-Price Competition In An Oligopolistic Industry," Papers 3-88-14, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  9. Kooreman, P., 1994. "Estimation of econometric models of some discrete games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377584, Tilburg University.
  10. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1993. "Estimation and Inference in Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195060119, September.
  11. Kooreman, Peter, 1994. "Estimation of Econometric Models of Some Discrete Games," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(3), pages 255-68, July-Sept.
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Cited by:
  1. Steven S. Vickner & Stephen P. Davies, 2000. "Estimating strategic price response in a product-differentiated oligopoly: The case of a domestic canned fruit industry," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(2), pages 125-140.
  2. Wang, Shinn-Shyr & Stiegert, Kyle W. & Dhar, Tirtha Pratim, 2005. "Strategic Pricing Behavior under Asset Value Maximization," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19198, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  3. Wang, Yafeng & Graham, Brett, 2009. "Generalized Maximum Entropy estimation of discrete sequential move games of perfect information," MPRA Paper 21331, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Horrace, William & Huang, Rui & Perloff, Jeffrey, 2009. "Variety: Consumer Choice and Optimal Diversity," Research Reports 149942, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
  5. Wang, Yafeng & Graham, Brett, 2010. "Identification and Estimation of a Discrete Game by Observing its Correlated Equilibria," MPRA Paper 45656, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 May 2011.
  6. Dhar, Tirtha Pratim & Chavas, Jean-Paul & Cotterill, Ronald W. & Gould, Brian W., 2002. "An Econometric Analysis of Brand Level Strategic Pricing Between Coca Cola and Pepsi Inc," Research Reports 25231, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.

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