Selective Versus Universal Vouchers: Modelling Median Voter Preferences in Education
AbstractUnder the majority voting rule, a system of universally available vouchers (UV) is politically less feasible than a system of selective vouchers (SV) confined to families with incomes equal to or less than median voter income. After the introduction of UV, public expenditure on education will have to be shared with previous private school users. Per capita expenditure will then drop and/or tax will increase. Since these events will injure the median voter, he will reject UV. He will be indifferent between the status quo and SV. Indifference will turn into enthusiasm however, if, as can be expected, the new regime (SV) brings effective new competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number 98-02.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Mar 1998
Date of revision: Dec 2000
Publication status: Published: – revised version in American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 5, (December 2000), pp. 1520–1534
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Other versions of this item:
- Edwin G. West & Zhiqi Chen, 2000. "Selective versus Universal Vouchers: Modelling Median Voter Preferences in Education," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1520-1534, December.
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
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