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Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy

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Author Info
Mattias Ganslandt (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))
Lars Persson () (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) and CEPR)
Helder Vasconcelos () (Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto) and CEPR)

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Abstract

In their merger control, EU and the US have considered symmetric size distribution (cost structure) of firms to be a factor potentially leading to collusion. We show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with higher risk of collusion, when firms face indivisible costs of collusion. In particular, we show that if the rule determining the collusive outcome has the property that the large (efficient) firm benefits sufficiently more from collusion when industry asymmetries increase, collusion can become more likely when firms are moderately asymmetric.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto) in its series Documentos de Trabalho em Economia (Working Papers in Economics) with number 15.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cap:wpaper:152007

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Related research
Keywords: Collusion Cost Asymmetries Merger Policy

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 2001. "Endogenous mergers in concentrated markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1213-1244, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Helder Vasconcelos, 2005. "Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 39-62, Spring.
  4. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2006. "What Determines Cartel Success?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(1), pages 43-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars & Vlachos, Jonas, 2006. "Entrepreneurial Innovations, Competition and Competition Policy," Working Paper Series 670, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Rothschild, R., 1999. "Cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 717-734, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume & Lars Sorgard, 2006. "National Versus International Mergers in Unionized Oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 212-233, Spring.
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  11. Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 2001. "The equilibrium ownership of an international oligopoly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 307-333, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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