Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets
Abstract"The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable 'grim trigger strategies' available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any "pre-entry" collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry." Copyright (c) 2008, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Volume (Year): 17 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/
Other versions of this item:
- Helder Vasconcelos & Helder Vasconcelos, 2008. "Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets," Working Papers 33, Portuguese Competition Authority.
- Vasconcelos, Helder, 2008. "Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6865, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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