This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

What determines debt intolerance? The role of political and monetary institutions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Raffaela Giordano () (Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Department)
Pietro Tommasino () (Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Department)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Why do some states default on their debt more often than others? We argue that sovereign default is the outcome of a political struggle among different groups of citizens. It is more likely to happen if: (i) domestic debt-holders are relatively weak; (ii) the the political costs of the financial turmoil typically triggered by a sovereign bankrupcy are small. We show that these conditions are in turn more likely to be present if a country lacks a well-developed financial system and/or a sufficiently independent central bank.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td09/TD700_09/TD_700_09_en/en_tema_700.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department in its series Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) with number 700.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_700_09

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Via Nazionale, 91 - 00184 Roma
Web page: http://www.bancaditalia.it
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: fiscal sustainability; political economy; bank runs; central bank independance; financial development.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Eaton, Jonathan & Fernandez, Raquel, 1995. "Sovereign debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 2031-2077 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth & Savastano, Miguel, 2003. "Debt intolerance," MPRA Paper 13932, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2008. "The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt," NBER Working Papers 13946, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Albanesi, Stefania, 2007. "Inflation and inequality," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 1088-1114, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Glaeser, Edward & Scheinkman, Jose & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The injustice of inequality," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 199-222, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Bank suspension of convertibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 177-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2007. "Why Are There Serial Defaulters? Evidence from Constitutions," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 713-730. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998. "Optimal Financial Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1245-1284, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-61, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 1999. "The twin crises: The causes of banking and balance of payments problems," MPRA Paper 14081, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Beetsma, Roel M W J & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1996. " Does Inequality Cause Inflation?: The Political Economy of Inflation, Taxation and Government Debt," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 143-62, April.
    Other versions:
  14. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is not the only service displaying RePEc data. Choose on RePEc which service fits your needs best.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.