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The Politics Of Debt Crises

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  • Weder di Mauro, Beatrice
  • Van Rijckeghem, Caroline

Abstract

This paper shows that politics matter in explaining defaults on external and domestic debt obligations. We explore a large number of political and macroeconomic variables using a nonparametric technique to predict safety from default. The advantage of this technique is that it is able to identify complementarities that are not captured in standard probit analysis. We find that political factors matter, and do so in different ways for democratic and non-democratic regimes, and for domestic and external debt. Moreover we find that there is an important complementarity between political and economic conditions, which is essential in explaining the incidence of default.

Suggested Citation

  • Weder di Mauro, Beatrice & Van Rijckeghem, Caroline, 2004. "The Politics Of Debt Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 4683, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4683
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    Cited by:

    1. Giordano, Raffaela & Tommasino, Pietro, 2011. "What determines debt intolerance? The role of political and monetary institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 471-484, September.
    2. Podstawski, Maximilian & Velinov, Anton, 2018. "The state dependent impact of bank exposure on sovereign risk," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 88, pages 63-75.
    3. Oya Celasun & Philipp Harms, 2011. "Boon Or Burden? The Effect Of Private Sector Debt On The Risk Of Sovereign Default In Developing Countries," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(1), pages 70-88, January.
    4. Cuadra, Gabriel & Sapriza, Horacio, 2008. "Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 78-88, September.
    5. Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2010. "Domestic vs external sovereign debt servicing: an empirical analysis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(1), pages 93-103.
    6. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Horacio Sapriza, 2007. "The economics of sovereign defaults," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 93(Spr), pages 163-187.
    7. Waldenström, Daniel, 2006. "Why Does Sovereign Risk Differ for Domestic and Foreign Investors? Evidence from Scandinavia, 1938­­–1948," Working Paper Series 677, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    8. Trebesch, Christoph, 2008. "Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructurings. Should we really blame the creditors?," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Zurich 2008 44, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    9. Agliardi, Elettra & Agliardi, Rossella & Pinar, Mehmet & Stengos, Thanasis & Topaloglou, Nikolas, 2012. "A new country risk index for emerging markets: A stochastic dominance approach," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 741-761.
    10. Riccardo Realfonzo & Angelantonio Viscione, 2015. "The Real Effects of a Euro Exit: Lessons from the Past," International Journal of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(3), pages 161-173, July.
    11. Moser, Christoph, 2007. "The Impact of Political Risk on Sovereign Bond Spreads - Evidence from Latin America," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 24, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    12. Podstawski, Maximilian & Velinov, Anton, 2018. "The state dependent impact of bank exposure on sovereign risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 63-75.
    13. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Horacio Sapriza, 2009. "Heterogeneous Borrowers In Quantitative Models Of Sovereign Default," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1129-1151, November.
    14. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2010. "International Government Debt," Business School Working Papers 2010-03, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    15. Islam, Md Shahidul & Alam, Md Samsul & Bin Hasan, Shehub & Mollah, Sabur, 2022. "Firm-level political risk and distance-to-default," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign debt crises; Political institutions; Early warning systems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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