Collusion By Asymmetricaly Informed Firms

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Collusion By Asymmetricaly Informed Firms

Author Info

KIHLSTROM, R.
VIVES, X.

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Xavier Vives

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 125-89.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:125-89

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Other versions of this item:

Article
- Kihlstrom, Richard & Vives, Xavier, 1992. "Collusion by Asymmetrically Informed Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(2), pages 371-96, Summer.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Michel Cavagnac, 1994. "Le 'dilemme des prisonniers' : les arguments d'une coopération en information incompléte," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 35, pages 01, Juillet-S. [Downloadable!]
Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000081, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2002. "Collusion and price rigidity," Discussion Papers 0102-38, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Working papers 98-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 317-349, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Pouyet, J. & Verouden, V., 2000. "Cartel formation under incomplete information : on the requirements of collusion-proofness," Discussion Paper 1, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1991. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs," Papers of Peter Cramton 90ier, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1986. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs," Working Papers 619, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Cramton, Peter C & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1990. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 17-47, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Miklos-Thal, Jeanine, 2008. "Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry," MPRA Paper 11044, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Gea M. Lee, 2004. "Collusion with Internal Contracting," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 693, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

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