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Cartel Behaviour and Adverse Selection

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  • Roberts, Kevin

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 33 (1985)
Issue (Month): 4 (June)
Pages: 401-13

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:33:y:1985:i:4:p:401-13

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821

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Cited by:
  1. Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1990. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Working Papers 731, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Towards a Theory of Competition Policy," IDEI Working Papers 121, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  3. Andrea Lofaro, 1999. "When imperfect collusion is profitable," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(3), pages 235-259, October.
  4. Lee, Gea M., 2010. "Optimal collusion with internal contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 646-669, March.
  5. Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000081, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Josef Schroth, 2013. "Fiscal policy coordination in monetary unions," 2013 Meeting Papers 74, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Laffont, Jean Jacques, 1997. "Collusion et information asymétrique," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(4), pages 595-609, décembre.
  8. Jeanine Thal, 2005. "Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry," Working Papers 2005-36, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  9. Claude d'Aspremont & Jacques Crémer & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 281-310, October.
  10. Joao Correia-da-Silva, 2013. "Impossibility of market division with two-sided private information about production costs," FEP Working Papers 490, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  11. Gea M. Lee, 2004. "Collusion with Internal Contracting," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 693, Econometric Society.
  12. Pouyet, J. & Verouden, V.C.H.M., 2000. "Cartel Formation under Incomplete Information: on the Requirements of Collusion-Proofness," Discussion Paper 2000-01, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  13. Mark Gradstein, 1994. "Implementation of social optimum in oligopoly," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 319-326, December.

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