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The private supply of a public good

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Author Info
Werner Güth
Martin Hellwig

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF03051789
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (1986)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 121-159
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:5:y:1986:i:1:p:121-159

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  1. Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-42, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  2. Peter Postl, . "Efficient Compromising," Discussion Papers 06-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
  3. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hans Gersbach, 2009. "Competition of politicians for wages and office," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 51-71, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Martin Hellwig, 2006. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_15, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 12532, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Martin Hellwig, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  9. Tilman Börgers & Peter Postl, 2005. "Efficient Compromising," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000801, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Hellwig, Martin, 2003. "A Utilitarian Approach to the Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-36, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," MPRA Paper 6549, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. John O. Ledyard & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1994. "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms," Game Theory and Information 9405003, EconWPA, revised 22 May 1994. [Downloadable!]
  13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  14. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., . "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms," Working Papers 717, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  15. Patrick Schmitz, 1998. "Randomization in coalition contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 341-353, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  17. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods," Discussion Papers 265, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  18. Tilman Börgers & Peter Postl, 2005. "Efficient Compromising," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000188, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents," JEPS Working Papers 05-007, JEPS.
    Other versions:
  20. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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