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Gender Identification and Stake Size Effects in the Impunity Game

Author

Listed:
  • Anabel Doñate-Buendía

    (Universitat Jaume I)

  • Hernán Bejarano

    (Centro de Investigación y Docencias Económicas)

  • Aurora García-Gallego

    (Universitat Jaume I)

Abstract

In the impunity game, a proposer offers a division of money and a responder decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the proposer and the responder receive the amount specified in the proposal. If the offer is rejected, the responder earns nothing and the proposer keeps the money he designated for himself. Thus, the theoretical prediction of this game states that the responder should accept any offer. An experiment is designed aiming at analysing both players’ behaviour in the impunity game when subjects are aware of the gender of their partner. Additionally, we examine the effect of different stake sizes. An online experiment with eight different treatments is implemented, with a total number of 1,210 observations. The main findings are that proposers give to responders an important (around 35%) share on average, and that both the stake size and gender identification influence their decisions. Moreover, responders’ rejection patterns follow the game theoretical prediction, although the hypothesis that knowing your counterpart sex/gender affects responders’ behaviour cannot be rejected. Finally, subjects’ behaviour in this game is found to be determined by their personality and psychopathy traits, as well as by their emotional intelligence level. Other sociodemographic characteristics like place of birth or their employment status are found to also influence their decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Anabel Doñate-Buendía & Hernán Bejarano & Aurora García-Gallego, 2023. "Gender Identification and Stake Size Effects in the Impunity Game," Working Papers 249, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:249
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/249.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    impunity game; experiment; gender identification; stake size;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C88 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Other Computer Software
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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