Protests and Beliefs in Social Coordination in Africa
AbstractLeaders’ misbehaviors may durably undermine the credibility of the state. Using individual level survey in the aftermath of geo-localized social protests in Africa, we find that trust in monitoring institutions and beliefs in social coordination strongly evolve after riots, together with trust in leaders. As no signs of social unrest can be recorded before, the social conflict can be interpreted as a sudden signal sent on a leader’s action from which citizens extract information on the country’s institutions. Our interpretation is the following. Agents lend their taxes to a leader with imperfect information on the leader’s type and the underlying capacity of institutions to monitor her. A misbehavior is then interpreted as a failure of institutions to secure taxes given by citizens and makes agents (i) reluctant to contribute to the state effort, (ii) skeptical about the contributions of others.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France in its series AMSE Working Papers with number 1328.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2013
Date of revision: Apr 2013
Social conflicts; norms of cooperation; trust; institutions.;
Other versions of this item:
- Marc Sangnier & Yanos Zylberberg, 2013. "Protests and Beliefs in Social Coordination in Africa," Working Papers halshs-00822377, HAL.
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2013-05-05 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-05-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2013-05-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-DEV-2013-05-05 (Development)
- NEP-SOC-2013-05-05 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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