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Emotions and Political Unrest

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  • Passarelli, Francesco
  • Tabellini, Guido

Abstract

This paper formulates a theory of how political unrest influences public policy. Political unrest is motivated by emotions. Individuals engage in protests if they are aggrieved and feel that they have been treated unfairly. This reaction is predictable because individuals have a consistent view of what is fair. This framework yields novel insights about the sources of political influence of different groups in society. Even if the government is benevolent and all groups have access to the same technology for political participation, equilibrium policy can be distorted. Individuals form their view of what is fair taking into account the current state of the world. If fewer aggregate resources are available, individuals accept a lower level of welfare. This resignation effect in turn induces a benevolent government to procrastinate unpleasant policy choices.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 9446.

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Date of creation: May 2013
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9446

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Keywords: emotions; fairness; political economics; procrastrination; public debt; riots; unrest;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Thomas Moutos & Lambros Pechlivanos, 2013. "The Democratization of Rent Seeking in Greece," CESifo Working Paper Series 4331, CESifo Group Munich.

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