Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation
AbstractWe propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and losses of the renegotiated transaction. We show that loss aversion makes the renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long-term contracts. First, it explains why parties often abstain from writing a beneficial long-term contract or why some contracts specify transactions that are never ex post efficient. Second, it shows under what conditions parties should rely on the allocation of ownership rights to protect relationship-specific investments rather than writing a specific performance contract. Third, it shows that employment contracts can be strictly optimal even if parties are free to renegotiate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4031.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
renegotiation; incomplete contracts; reference points; employment contracts; behavioral contract theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2013. "Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79772, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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