The EU applies a complex system of preferences for tomato imports from Morocco. Quantities are fixed and serve as entry price quotas and tariff rate quotas at the same time. This paper provides empirical evidence of i) the existence of an economic rent under the EU preferential scheme for tomato imports from Morocco of about Â24-36.5 mill. per year, and ii) the distribution of that rent. Due to the structure of the Moroccan export sector as well as the EU method of allocating import licenses, it is likely that a large part of the quota rent ends up at the Moroccan side and that a dissipation of the rent in physical rent-seeking activities is limited.
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