Designing coordination contracts to support efficient flow-scheduling in pork chain
AbstractRisk management and efficient, well coordinated, flow-scheduling have an increasingly important role in the competitive pork production networks. Changes in input and output prices have resulted in distortions in the Finnish pig markets during the last years. The goal of this study is to estimate how different price or quantity-fixing contracts affect the values of pig and sow space unit under price risk. The values are estimated with two stochastic dynamic programming models. The results suggest that a contract which is able to control both the pattern of changes in piglet prices and the option to suspend production temporarily has a value and it can help to improve the competitiveness of the pig sector. However, it is feasible to have incentives towards the contract commitment when market situation upon accepting the commitment is favourable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its series 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington with number 125208.
Date of creation: Jun 2012
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Pigmeat; piglet; price feed; contract; market distortions; risk; Agribusiness; Farm Management; Livestock Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty; Q12; Q13; C61;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
- Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-08 (All new papers)
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