IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/acb/cbeeco/2017-653.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Emotions in Civil Litigation

Author

Listed:
  • Ben Chen
  • Jose A. Rodrigues Neto

Abstract

In a civil-litigation game, monetary and emotional variables motivate a plaintiff and a defendant simultaneously to exert costly efforts; the emotional variables capture their relational emotions toward each other, and a non-monetary joy of winning. Based on the litigants’ efforts and exogenous relative advantages, a generally-formulated success function gives their probabilities of success. A cost-shifting rule shifts a proportion of the winner’s costs to the loser. In equilibrium, negative relational emotions (but not positive joy of winning) amplify the effects of cost shifting. Negative relational emotions increase the equilibrium relative effort and probability of success of the more advantageous litigant.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben Chen & Jose A. Rodrigues Neto, 2017. "Emotions in Civil Litigation," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2017-653, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2017-653
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp653.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sheremeta, Roman M., 2010. "Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 731-747, March.
    2. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    3. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    4. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1998. "Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 141-157, January.
    5. Price, Curtis R. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Endowment effects in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 217-219, June.
    6. Kathryn E. Spier, 1994. "Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 197-214, Summer.
    7. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2005. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 583-601, July.
    8. Katz, Avery, 1987. "Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 143-176, Fall.
    9. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    10. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Persuasion as a contest," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 465-486, October.
    11. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 575-612, June.
    12. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
    13. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1998. "The social basis of interdependent preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 779-800, May.
    14. Segal, Uzi & Sobel, Joel, 2007. "Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 197-216, September.
    15. Pollak, Robert A, 1976. "Interdependent Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 309-320, June.
    16. Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
    17. Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, 2005. "Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 285-314, October.
    18. Hyde, Charles E. & Williams, Philip L., 2002. "Necessary costs and expenditure incentives under the English rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 133-152, August.
    19. Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2012. "Litigation and legal evolution: does procedure matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 181-201, July.
    20. Hause, John C, 1989. "Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 157-179, January.
    21. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    22. Diewert, W. E. & Avriel, M. & Zang, I., 1981. "Nine kinds of quasiconcavity and concavity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 397-420, December.
    23. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    24. Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December.
    25. Dhami, Sanjit, 2016. "The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198715535, Decembrie.
    26. Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking," Discussion Papers 2008-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    27. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Chang, Howard F, 1996. "An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 371-403, June.
    28. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    29. Farmer Amy & Pecorino Paul, 2016. "Litigation with a Variable Cost of Trial," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 203-226, July.
    30. Ben Chen & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2017. "Cost Shifting in Civil Litigation: A General Theory," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2017-651, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    31. Fonseca, Miguel A., 2009. "An experimental investigation of asymmetric contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 582-591, September.
    32. Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-219, Spring.
    33. Carbonara Emanuela & Parisi Francesco & von Wangenheim Georg, 2015. "Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The Hidden Virtues of Limited Fee Shifting," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 113-148, July.
    34. Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 2008. "A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 571-585, March.
    35. Chris William Sanchirico (ed.), 2012. "Procedural Law and Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13092.
    36. Gong, Jiong & McAfee, R Preston, 2000. "Pretrial Negotiation, Litigation, and Procedural Rules," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 218-238, April.
    37. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter.
    38. Plott, Charles R, 1987. "Legal Fees: A Comparison of the American and English Rules," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 185-192, Fall.
    39. Edward Millner & Michael Pratt, 1989. "An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 139-151, August.
    40. Hiroyuki Sano, 2014. "Reciprocal rent-seeking contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 575-596, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Friehe, Tim & Pham, Cat Lam, 2021. "Accident avoidance and settlement bargaining: The role of reciprocity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ben Chen & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2023. "The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 841-885, April.
    2. Ben Chen & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2017. "Cost Shifting in Civil Litigation: A General Theory," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2017-651, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    3. Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Saraceno, Margherita, 2020. "Fee shifting and accuracy in adjudication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    4. Hoffmann, Magnus & Kolmar, Martin, 2017. "Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 120-139.
    5. Wladislaw Mill & Jonathan Stäbler, 2023. "Spite in Litigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 10290, CESifo.
    6. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    7. Shupp, Robert & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Schmidt, David & Walker, James, 2013. "Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 257-267.
    8. Schwab, Christian & Tang, Hin-Yue Benny, 2011. "Die Steuerungswirkungen unterschiedlicher Prozesskostenregelungen: Ein Überblick zum Stand von Theorie und Empirie [The economic effects of alternative fee shifting rules: A review of the theoretic," MPRA Paper 32746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding And Heterogeneous Behavior In Contest Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 491-514, July.
    10. Friehe, Tim & Pham, Cat Lam, 2021. "Accident avoidance and settlement bargaining: The role of reciprocity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    11. Sheremeta, Roman, 2016. "Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding in Rent-Seeking Contests," MPRA Paper 73731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Hoffmann, Magnus & Kolmar, Martin, 2013. "Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 276-279.
    13. Cox, Caleb A., 2017. "Rent-seeking and competitive preferences," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 102-116.
    14. Cason, Timothy N. & Masters, William A. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2020. "Winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: Theory and experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 314-327.
    15. Baptiste Massenot & Maria Maraki & Christian Thoeni, 2016. "Legal compliance and litigation spending under the English and American rule: Experimental evidence," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.19, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    16. Doménech-Pascual, Gabriel & Martínez-Matute, Marta & Mora-Sanguinetti, Juan S., 2021. "Do fee-shifting rules affect plaintiffs’ win rates? A theoretical and empirical analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    17. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2010. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 18-27, March.
    18. Faravelli, Marco & Stanca, Luca, 2014. "Economic incentives and social preferences: Causal evidence of non-separability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 273-289.
    19. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2017. "Decisiveness, peace, and inequality in games of conflict," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 216-229.
    20. Andreozzi, Luciano, 2013. "Learning to be fair," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 181-195.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    relative payoffs; non-monetary joy of winning; interdependent preferences; litigation; contest theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2017-653. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feanuau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.