IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/b/elg/eebook/14208.html
   My bibliography  Save this book

Cartels and Economic Collusion

Author

Listed:
  • Michael A. Utton

Abstract

Adam Smith warned of the prevalence of corporate conspiracies more than two hundred years ago. Since then, interest in cartels has sometimes intensified (during the Great Depression, for example) and sometimes diminished, but the need for control has always remained on the antitrust agenda. This well-documented book reviews the economic case against corporate collusion, as well as the arguments made for a more permissive attitude.

Individual chapters are listed in the "Chapters" tab

Suggested Citation

  • Michael A. Utton, 2011. "Cartels and Economic Collusion," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14208.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eebook:14208
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849807708.xml
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Broadberry, S. N. & Crafts, N. F. R., 1992. "Britain's Productivity Gap in the 1930s: Some Neglected Factors," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(3), pages 531-558, September.
    2. M.A. Utton, 1979. "Diversification and Competition," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 89(1), pages 53-55, August.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Bryant, Peter G & Eckard, E Woodrow, Jr, 1991. "Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(3), pages 531-536, August.
    5. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    6. John M. Connor, 2004. "Global Antitrust Prosecutions of Modern International Cartels," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 239-267, September.
    7. Scott,John T., 2005. "Purposive Diversification and Economic Performance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521022583.
    8. Shaw, R W & Shaw, S A, 1983. "Excess Capacity and Rationalisation in the West European Synthetic Fibres Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 149-166, December.
    9. Grossman, Gene M & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Research Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 315-337, Fall.
    10. Peter J. Buckley & Mark Casson, 1985. "The Economic Theory of the Multinational Enterprise," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-05242-4.
    11. Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 163-198, December.
    12. Patrick A. Messerlin, 1990. "Anti-Dumping Regulations or Pro-Cartel Law? The EC Chemical Cases," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 465-492, December.
    13. Michael A. Utton, 2006. "International Competition Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 4010.
    14. Simon J. Evenett & Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2001. "International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(9), pages 1221-1245, September.
    15. Dick, Andrew R, 1996. "When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 241-283, April.
    16. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1985. "Detrebling Antitrust Damages," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 445-467, May.
    17. Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson (ed.), 1986. "New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262690934, December.
    18. Valerie Y. Suslow, 2005. "Cartel contract duration: empirical evidence from inter-war international cartels," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 14(5), pages 705-744, October.
    19. Michael A. Utton, 2003. "Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy, Second Edition," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2461.
    20. Posner, Richard A, 1970. "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 365-419, October.
    21. Bresnahan, Timothy F., 1989. "Empirical studies of industries with market power," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 17, pages 1011-1057, Elsevier.
    22. Connor, John M. & Bolotova, Yuliya, 2006. "Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1109-1137, November.
    23. George Hay, 2000. "The Meaning of ``Agreement'' under the Sherman Act: Thoughts from the ``Facilitating Practices'' Experience," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 16(2), pages 113-129, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Willem H. Boshoff & Rossouw van Jaarsveld, 2019. "Recurrent Collusion: Cartel Episodes and Overcharges in the South African Cement Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 353-380, March.
    2. Choi, Daewoung & Gam, Yong Kyu & Shin, Hojong, 2020. "Corporate fraud under pyramidal ownership structure: Evidence from a regulatory reform," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(C).
    3. Hubert Buch-Hansen & Clement Levallois, 2015. "The Scale and Geography of Collusion in the European Market: A Longitudinal View," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 737-752, July.
    4. Rastislav Funta, 2012. "Legal and Economic Analysis of Cartels, their Enforcement and the Leniency Program," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 35-47, June.
    5. Agnihotri, Arpita, 2015. "How to avoid regulatory antitrust scrutiny: The behavioral defense," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 441-447.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bolotova, Yuliya V., 2009. "Cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 321-341, May.
    2. Connor, John M., 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, And Anticartel Enforcement," Staff Papers 28645, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    3. Panayiotis Agisilaou, 2013. "Collusion in Industrial Economics and Optimally Designed Leniency Programmes - A Survey," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-03, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    4. Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2018. "When Do Firms Leave Cartels? Determinants And The Impact On Cartel Survival," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 68-84.
    5. Zhang, Yahua & Round, David K., 2011. "Price wars and price collusion in China's airline markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 361-372, July.
    6. Tim Reuter, 2017. "Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(3), pages 291-313, November.
    7. Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, 2016. "Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(4), pages 405-432, June.
    8. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2011. "Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(2), pages 455-492.
    9. Brenner, Steffen, 2009. "An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 639-645, November.
    10. Jason E. Taylor, 2007. "Cartel Code Attributes and Cartel Performance: An Industry-Level Analysis of the National Industrial Recovery Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 597-624.
    11. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    12. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2018. "Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-25.
    13. Ari Hyytinen & Frode Steen & Otto Toivanen, 2019. "An Anatomy of Cartel Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(621), pages 2155-2191.
    14. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica, 2021. "Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 47-64, February.
    15. Stephen Davies & Oindrila De, 2013. "Ringleaders in Larger Number Asymmetric Cartels," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 524-544, November.
    16. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    17. Ari Hyytinen & Frode Steen & Otto Toivanen, 2018. "Cartels Uncovered," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 190-222, November.
    18. Swoboda, Sandra Maria, 2018. "Market structure and cartel duration: Evidence from detected EU cartel cases," Arbeitspapiere 184, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
    19. Cai, Xiaowei & Stiegert, Kyle W., 2010. "Cartel Dissolution with Effective Antitrust Policy," 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado 61297, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    20. Richard Schmalensee, 2012. "“On a Level with Dentists?” Reflections on the Evolution of Industrial Organization," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(3), pages 157-179, November.

    Book Chapters

    The following chapters of this book are listed in IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics and Finance;

    JEL classification:

    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:elg:eebook:14208. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Darrel McCalla (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.e-elgar.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.