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Global Antitrust Prosecutions Of Modern International Cartels

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Author Info
John M. Connor () (Department of Agricultural Economics, College of Agriculture, Purdue University)

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Abstract

International cartelists face investigations and possible fines in a score of national and supranational jurisdictions, but the three with the most consistent legal responses to global cartels are the United States, Canada, and the EU. This paper examines the antitrust fines and private penalties imposed on the participants of 167 international cartels discovered during 1990-2003. While more than US$ 10 billion in penalties has been imposed, it is doubtful that such monetary sanctions can deter modern international cartels. The apparently large size of government fines is distorted by one overwhelming case. Moreover, deterrence is frustrated by the failure of compensatory private suits to take hold outside of North America and the near absence of fines in most Asian jurisdictions. Without significant increases in cartel detection, in the levels of expected fines or civil settlements, or expansion of the standing of buyers to seek compensation, international price fixing will remain rational business conduct.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics in its series Working Papers with number 04-15.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:pae:wpaper:04-15

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Keywords: antitrust cartel price fixing

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  1. Jeroen Hinloopen, 2005. "The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-104/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jeroen Hinloopen, 2007. "The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1135-1135. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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