Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.
Volume (Year): 6 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 195-223
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=105724
Related research
Keywords: anti-trust sanction; cartel; optimal deterrence; L12; L42; K22; B14; F29;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- B14 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Socialist; Marxist
- F29 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Other
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Crandall, Robert W. & Winston, Clifford, 2004.
"Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence,"
Working paper
263, Regulation2point0.
- Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, 2003. "Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 3-26, Fall.
- Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow & Lynda Oswald, 2003. "International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 538, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Lynda Oswald & Valerie Suslow & Margaret Levenstein & Manuel Pastor, 2003. "International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies," Working Papers wp53, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
- John M. Connor, 2004. "Global Antitrust Prosecutions Of Modern International Cartels," Working Papers 04-15, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- John Connor, 2004. "Global Antitrust Prosecutions of Modern International Cartels," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 239-267, September.
- Sproul, Michael F, 1993. "Antitrust and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 741-54, August.
- Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow & Lynda Oswald, 2003. "International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies," NBER Working Papers 9511, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Clarke, Julian L. & Evenett, Simon J., 2002. "The Deterrent Effects of National Anti-Cartel Laws: Evidence from the International Vitamins Cartel," Working paper 131, Regulation2point0.
- Connor, John M., 2005. "Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal And Economic Evidence," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19254, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- John M. Connor, 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement," Working Papers 03-12, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Cai, Xiaowei & Stiegert, Kyle W., 2010. "Cartel Dissolution with Effective Antitrust Policy," 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado 61297, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Martin Carree & Andrea Günster & Maarten Schinkel, 2010. "European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 97-131, March.
- Vivek Ghosal, 2011.
"The Law and Economics of Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information From Non-Cartel Investigations to Prosecute Cartels,"
Review of Law & Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 7.
- Vivek Ghosal, 2011. "The Law and Economics of Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information from Non-Cartel Investigations to Prosecute Cartels," CESifo Working Paper Series 3506, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ghosal, Vivek, 2006. "Discovering Cartels: Dynamic Interrelationships between Civil and Criminal Antitrust Investigations," MPRA Paper 5499, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- John Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, 2006. "Statistics On Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005," Working Papers 06-11, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
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