The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements
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- Hinloopen Jeroen, 2007. "The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-13, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Cartel stability; detection probabilities; statue of limitation.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-LAW-2006-01-24 (Law and Economics)
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