What could anti-trust in the OECD do for development?
AbstractThe extra-territorial effects of cartels, mergers and other non-competitive activities require consideration especially if they harm consumers and firms in developing countries. This paper provides an overview of the available empirical literature regarding the impact of cartels, mergers and abuses of dominance that are rooted in the OECD. Typically the available evidence is not yet sufficiently comprehensive to allow robust conclusions, but (with no claim on accuracy), it seems reasonable that the direct impact on developing countries is very substantial and in welfare terms may exceed the contribution by Official Development Aid. OECD countries could contribute to development through the activities of their competition authorities and appropriate changes in legislation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague in its series ISS Working Papers - General Series with number 18720.
Date of creation: 01 May 2009
Date of revision:
cartel; competition policy; developing countries; merger; restrictive business practices;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
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