Cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis
AbstractUsing 406 overcharge estimates, the study analyzes the impact of cartel characteristics and the market environment on the magnitude of overcharges attained by cartels in different geographic markets and during six antitrust law regimes starting from the 18th century. The median overcharge achieved by cartels is 20 percent of selling price. As predicted by cartel theory, market structure is an important determinant of the overcharge level. Markets where cartels have high market shares tend to have higher overcharges. The number of cartel participants and the size inequality among them are inversely related to the overcharge level. International cartels impose higher overcharges than domestic cartels. Overcharges attained in the US and European markets tend to be lower than overcharges achieved in the Asian markets and the rest of the world. Results on the impact of changes in the antitrust law environment over time on the size of cartel overcharges are mixed. However, there is some evidence indicating that the lowest overcharges are associated with the latest antitrust law period.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 70 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Antitrust Cartels Collusion Overcharges;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Genesove, David & Mullin, Wallace P, 2001.
"Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2739, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 2001. "Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 379-398, June.
- David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 2001. "Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case," NBER Working Papers 8145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Posner, Richard A, 1970. "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 365-419, October.
- Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997.
"The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior,"
Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
- Clarke, Julian L. & Evenett, Simon J., 2002. "The Deterrent Effects of National Anti-Cartel Laws: Evidence from the International Vitamins Cartel," Working paper 131, Regulation2point0.
- Froeb, Luke M. & Koyak, Robert A. & Werden, Gregory J., 1993.
"What is the effect of bid-rigging on prices?,"
Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 419-423.
- Connor, John M., 2005. "Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal And Economic Evidence," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19254, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Bryant, Peter G & Eckard, E Woodrow, Jr, 1991. "Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(3), pages 531-36, August.
- Valerie Y. Suslow, 2005. "Cartel contract duration: empirical evidence from inter-war international cartels," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(5), pages 705-744, October.
- Yuliya Bolotova & John M. Connor & Douglas J. Miller, 2007. "Factors influencing the magnitude of cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis of food-industry cartels," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(1), pages 17-33.
- Dick, Andrew R, 1996. "When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 241-83, April.
- Hay, George A & Kelley, Daniel, 1974. "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 13-38, April.
- Madhavan, Ananth N & Masson, Robert T & Lesser, William H, 1994. "Cooperation for Monopolization? An Empirical Analysis of Cartelization," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(1), pages 161-75, February.
- John Connor, 2001. "“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 5-21, February.
- Connor, John M. & Bolotova, Yuliya, 2006. "Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1109-1137, November.
- Mittelhammer,Ron C. & Judge,George G. & Miller,Douglas J., 2000. "Econometric Foundations Pack with CD-ROM," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521623940, December.
- Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Endogenous Price Commitment, Sticky and Leadership Pricing: Evidence from the Italian Petrol Market," Discussion Papers in Economics 16182, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets," Discussion Papers in Economics 16179, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.