I study how education affects the allocation of talent into different sectors of the economy. I focus on two forces. First, education adds to a worker's information capital and, thus, may change her self-confidence. Second, performance contracts give a worker incentives to choose a sector according to her abilities. The baseline model predicts that workers with intermediate ability educate, while the most able skip education. In an extension, I compare the U.K. and the U.S. bachelor's degrees and, moreover, discuss hybrid educational systems, common in Europe, that offer both U.K. and U.S. types of bachelor's degrees.
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Volume (Year): 21 (2003) Issue (Month): 4 (October) Pages: 945-944 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Kim-Sau Chung & Peter Eso, 2007.
"Signalling with Career Concerns,"
Discussion Papers
1443, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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