Alliances Among Asymmetric Countries
AbstractWe examine alliances between asymmetric countries. We find that the results depend on the nature of the equilibrium. If the equilibrium is an interior one then, with an increase in asymmetry, the level of the alliance-wide defense good decreases and the divergence between the first best and the equilibrium level of the defense good increases. In the case where the equilibrium involves a corner solution, these results are reversed. It may be argued, however, that the interior equilibrium case is the more relevant one.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.
Volume (Year): 18 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20
Other versions of this item:
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2006. "Alliances among asymmetric countries," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 06-04, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2006. "Alliances Among Asymmetric Countries," MPRA Paper 1502, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley & Todd Sandler, 1999.
"Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction,"
Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001)
99/02, Department of Economics, Keele University.
- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger & Sandler, Todd, 1999. " Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 499-509.
- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger & Sandler, Todd, 1999. "Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof Via Contraction," Staff General Research Papers 1630, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Wong, K-Y., 1988. "Foreign Trade, Military Alliance, And Defence-Burden Sharing," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 88-11, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1990. "Economic Models of NATO," Papers 90-7, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
- Sandler, Todd, 1977. "Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 443-60.
- Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.