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On sharing NATO defence burdens in the 1990s and beyond

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  • Todd Sandler
  • James C. Murdoch

Abstract

This article investigates NATO burden sharing in the 1990s in light of strategic, technological, political and membership changes. Both an ability-to-pay and a benefits-received analysis of burden sharing are conducted. During 1990-99, there is no evidence of disproportionate burden sharing, where the large allies shoulder the burdens of the small. Nevertheless, the theoretical model predicts that this disproportionality will plague NATO in the near future. Thus far, there is still a significant concordance between benefits received and defence burdens carried. When alternative expansion scenarios are studied, the extent of disproportionality of burden sharing increases as NATO grows in size. A broader security burden-sharing measure is devised and tested; based on this broader measure, there is still no disproportionality evident in the recent past.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Institute for Fiscal Studies in its journal Fiscal Studies.

Volume (Year): 21 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 297-327

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Handle: RePEc:ifs:fistud:v:21:y:2000:i:3:p:297-327

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  1. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1999. "The Political Economy of NATO," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521638807, Fall.
  2. Oneal, John R., 1990. "The theory of collective action and burden sharing in NATO," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(03), pages 379-402, June.
  3. Murdoch, James C., 1995. "Military alliances: Theory and empirics," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 89-108 Elsevier.
  4. Smith, R P, 1989. "Models of Military Expenditure," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(4), pages 345-59, Oct.-Dec..
  5. Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd, 1999. "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," Staff General Research Papers 1532, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Bove, Vincenzo & Efthyvoulou, Georgios, 2013. "Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs Guns," NEPS Working Papers 7/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.

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