Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction
AbstractThis paper presents a proof for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium of a public good model that exploits a simple contraction mapping. The proof establishes both existence and uniqueness in a single exercise that provides intuition about sufficiency. The method of proof is applied not only to the basic pure public good model but also to the impure model. In the latter model, income normality does not play the same pivotal role for existence and uniqueness. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Keele University in its series Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) with number 99/02.
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 1, 1999, pages 499 - 509.
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Postal: Department of Economics, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
Other versions of this item:
- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger & Sandler, Todd, 1999. " Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 499-509.
- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger & Sandler, Todd, 1999. "Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof Via Contraction," Staff General Research Papers 1630, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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