Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction
AbstractThis paper presents a proof for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium of a public good model that exploits a simple contraction mapping. The proof establishes both existence and uniqueness in a single exercise that provides intuition about sufficiency. The method of proof is applied not only to the basic pure public good model but also to the impure model. In the latter model, income normality does not play the same pivotal role for existence and uniqueness. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 1 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley & Todd Sandler, 1999. "Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 99/02, Department of Economics, Keele University.
- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger & Sandler, Todd, 1999. "Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof Via Contraction," Staff General Research Papers 1630, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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