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Alternative Collective-Goods Models of Military Alliances: Theory and Empirics

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  • Conybeare, John A C
  • Murdoch, James C
  • Sandler, Todd

Abstract

How should the defense activities of allies be aggregated to determine the alliance-wide level of defense? Two alternative models--best shot and weakest link--are contrasted with simple summation of defense spending or manpower for aggregating allies' defense efforts. The authors extend the joint product model to include these methods of aggregation and devise an empirical procedure to test between best-shot and weakest-link models. They apply this test to four alliances: Triple Alliance (1880-1914), Triple Entente (1880-1914), Warsaw Pact (1963-87), and NATO (1961-87). The testing procedure can be applied to other collective choice situations. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 32 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 525-42

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:32:y:1994:i:4:p:525-42

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References

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  1. Glenn W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, 1988. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest-Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," UCLA Economics Working Papers 473, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Sandler, Todd & Murdoch, James C, 1990. "Nash-Cournot or Lindahl Behavior? An Empirical Test for the NATO Allies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 875-94, November.
  3. Sandler, Todd, 1977. "Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 443-60.
  4. Cornes, Richard, 1993. "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 259-71, February.
  5. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
  6. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
  7. McGuire, Martin C & Groth, Carl H, Jr, 1985. "A Method for Identifying the Public Good Allocation Process within a Group," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(5), pages 915-34, Supp..
  8. Crafts, N. F. R., 1983. "Gross national product in Europe 1870-1910: Some new estimates," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 387-401, October.
  9. Sandler, Todd & Forbes, John F, 1980. "Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(3), pages 425-44, July.
  10. Wong, K-Y., 1988. "Foreign Trade, Military Alliance, And Defence-Burden Sharing," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 88-11, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  11. Leonard Dudley & Claude Montmarquette, 1981. "The demand for military expenditures: An international comparison," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 5-31, January.
  12. Beach, Charles M & MacKinnon, James G, 1978. "A Maximum Likelihood Procedure for Regression with Autocorrelated Errors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 51-58, January.
  13. Okamura, Minoru, 1991. "Estimating the Impact of the Soviet Union's Threat on the United States-Japan Alliance: A Demand System Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 200-207, May.
  14. Murdoch, James C & Sandler, Todd & Hansen, Laurna, 1991. "An Econometric Technique for Comparing Median Voter and Oligarchy Choice Models of Collective Action: The Case of the NATO Alliance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(4), pages 624-31, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Binyam Solomon, 2005. "The demand for Canadian defence expenditures," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 171-189.
  2. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September.
  3. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 251-276, June.
  4. Todd Sandler, 2006. "Hirshleifer'S Social Composition Function In Defense Economics," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 645-655.
  5. Burnett, Kimberly M., 2006. "Introductions of Invasive Species: Failure of the Weaker Link," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 35(1), April.
  6. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2014. "Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot”," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 333-373, June.
  7. Hubert Van Tuyll & Jurgen Brauer, 2003. "Colonizing military history: A millennial view on the economics of war," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 155-173.
  8. María del Carmen García-Alonso & Keith Hartley, 1999. "Export Controls, Market Structure and International Coordination," Studies in Economics 9908, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
  9. Jack Hirshleifer, 1993. "The Dark Side of the Force," UCLA Economics Working Papers 702, UCLA Department of Economics.

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