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Alternative Collective-Goods Models of Military Alliances: Theory and Empirics

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Author Info
Conybeare, John A C
Murdoch, James C
Sandler, Todd

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Abstract

How should the defense activities of allies be aggregated to determine the alliance-wide level of defense? Two alternative models--best shot and weakest link--are contrasted with simple summation of defense spending or manpower for aggregating allies' defense efforts. The authors extend the joint product model to include these methods of aggregation and devise an empirical procedure to test between best-shot and weakest-link models. They apply this test to four alliances: Triple Alliance (1880-1914), Triple Entente (1880-1914), Warsaw Pact (1963-87), and NATO (1961-87). The testing procedure can be applied to other collective choice situations. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 32 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 525-42
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:32:y:1994:i:4:p:525-42

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sandler, Todd, 1977. "Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 443-60.
  2. Crafts, N. F. R., 1983. "Gross national product in Europe 1870-1910: Some new estimates," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 387-401, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Beach, Charles M & MacKinnon, James G, 1978. "A Maximum Likelihood Procedure for Regression with Autocorrelated Errors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 51-58, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sandler, Todd & Forbes, John F, 1980. "Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 425-44, July.
  6. Murdoch, James C & Sandler, Todd & Hansen, Laurna, 1991. "An Econometric Technique for Comparing Median Voter and Oligarchy Choice Models of Collective Action: The Case of the NATO Alliance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(4), pages 624-31, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. McGuire, Martin C & Groth, Carl H, Jr, 1985. "A Method for Identifying the Public Good Allocation Process within a Group," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(5), pages 915-34, Supp.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Wong, K-Y., 1988. "Foreign Trade, Military Alliance, And Defence-Burden Sharing," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 88-11, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. María del Carmen García-Alonso & Keith Hartley, 1999. "Export Controls, Market Structure and International Coordination," Studies in Economics 9908, Department of Economics, University of Kent. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hubert Van Tuyll & Jurgen Brauer, 2003. "Colonizing Military History: A Millennial View On The Economics Of War," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 155-173, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jack Hirshleifer, 1993. "The Dark Side of the Force," UCLA Economics Working Papers 702, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Todd Sandler, 2006. "HIRSHLEIFER’S SOCIAL COMPOSITION FUNCTION IN DEFENSE ECONOMICS," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 645-655, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Binyam Solomon, 2005. "The demand for Canadian defence expenditures," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 171-189, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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