The demand for military expenditures: An international comparison
AbstractEarlier studies have explained inter-country variations in the share of GNP devoted to military expenditures by international spillovers and by differences in the threat of attack related to relative incomes. In this paper, we use the theory of public choice to explain these differences. We attempt to measure the importance of both international spillovers and relative incomes, along with two other factors: the tax-price elasticity of demand and economies of scale in the consumption of security. We find that international spillovers are significant and positive, that the income elasticity of demand is greater than unity, that the tax-price elasticity of demand explains part of observed inter-country differences, and that there are considerable economies of scale in the consumption of military spending. Finally, between 1960 and 1975, there was apparently a substantial increase in the value which each country derived from a dollar of military spending by its allies. This phenomenon, which seems related to the increased importance of deterrent weapons, has tended to induce individual alliance members to reduce the share of their national income devoted to defense. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 37 (1981)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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"Alternative Collective-Goods Models of Military Alliances: Theory and Empirics,"
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- John A Conbeare & James C Murdoch & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Alternative Collective-Goods Models of Military Alliances: Theory and Empirics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000102, David K. Levine.
- Unal Tongur & Sara Hsu & Adem Yavuz Elveren, 2013. "Military Expenditures and Political Regimes: An Analysis Using Global Data, 1963-2001," ERC Working Papers 1307, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Jul 2013.
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