Hirshleifer'S Social Composition Function In Defense Economics
AbstractThis article displays the importance and richness of Hirshleifer's social composition function in public good applications, particularly those in defense economics. This function indicates how individual contributions to the public good combine to determine the overall level of the good that is available for consumption. As such, the concept indicates the aggregation technology of public supply. Applications of this 'aggregator' notion include alliance burden sharing, counter-terrorism policy, and curbing weapon proliferation. For these applications, the article shows how alternate aggregators can have profoundly different collective action and policy implications.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.
Volume (Year): 17 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Conybeare, John A C & Murdoch, James C & Sandler, Todd, 1994.
"Alternative Collective-Goods Models of Military Alliances: Theory and Empirics,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(4), pages 525-42, October.
- John A Conbeare & James C Murdoch & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Alternative Collective-Goods Models of Military Alliances: Theory and Empirics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000102, David K. Levine.
- Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
- Cornes, Richard, 1993. "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 259-71, February.
- Vicary, Simon & Sandler, Todd, 2002. "Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1501-1520, September.
- Murdoch, James C & Sandler, Todd & Sargent, Keith, 1997. "A Tale of Two Collectives: Sulphur versus Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in Europe," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(254), pages 281-301, May.
- Todd Sandler, 1998.
"Global and regional public goods: a prognosis for collective action,"
Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 221-247, August.
- Sandler, Todd, 1998. "Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action," Staff General Research Papers 1225, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Glenn W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, 1988.
"An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest-Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
473, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-25, February.
- Glen W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, 1998. "An experimental evaluation of weakest link/best shot models of public goods," Levine's Working Paper Archive 299, David K. Levine.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, October.
- Todd Sandler, 2005. "Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 75-93, July.
- Sandler, Todd, 1977. "Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 443-60.
- K.J.M. De Jaegher & B. Hoyer, 2012. "Cooperation and the common enemy effect," Working Papers 12-24, Utrecht School of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.