Tradeoffs of foreign assistance for the weakest-link global public goods
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.
Volume (Year): 18 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915
Global public good; Foreign assistance; In-kind transfer; Weakest-link; Complementarity; Income neutrality; Foreign aid; C72; D61; F50; H40; H56;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
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