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An Econometric Technique for Comparing Median Voter and Oligarchy Choice Models of Collective Action: The Case of the NATO Alliance

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Author Info

  • Murdoch, James C
  • Sandler, Todd
  • Hansen, Laurna

Abstract

This paper devises an empirical methodology for discriminating between the median voter model and the oligarchy choice model when applied to the collective provision of a public good. In particular, an empirical methodology is engineered so that a nested test procedure can evaluate competing models. The authors apply this methodology to examine the demand for military activities of ten members of the NATO alliance. A two-stage least squares procedure, corrected for autocorrelation, is used to estimate the demand equations. Test results vary: some allies abide by the median voter model, others by the oligarchy model, and still others by neither. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics & Statistics.

Volume (Year): 73 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 624-31

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:73:y:1991:i:4:p:624-31

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Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/

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Web: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journal-home.tcl?issn=00346535

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Cited by:
  1. Conybeare, John A C & Murdoch, James C & Sandler, Todd, 1994. "Alternative Collective-Goods Models of Military Alliances: Theory and Empirics," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(4), pages 525-42, October.
  2. Gupta, Rupayan, 2010. "Changing Threat Perceptions and the Efficient Provisioning of International Security," MPRA Paper 24016, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Johan Lundberg, 2006. "Spatial interaction model of spillovers from locally provided public services," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(6), pages 631-644.
  4. Rupayan Gupta, 2010. "Structuring international institutions for the efficient provisioning of global security," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 169-197, July.
  5. Martial Foucault, 2005. "Biens publics et défense européenne : quel processus d'allocation ?," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j05082, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  6. Binyam Solomon, 2005. "Nato Benefits, Burdens And Borders: Reply," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 323-326.
  7. Binyam Solomon, 2005. "The demand for Canadian defence expenditures," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 171-189.

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