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Water Resource Allocation in Critical Scarcity Conditions: A Bankruptcy Game Approach

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  • Giovanni Sechi
  • Riccardo Zucca

Abstract

Water resource allocation in critical scarcity conditions represents a common problem in water-system management in Mediterranean regions. This article describes a methodology for the allocation of scarce resources in a complex supply system by using the Bankruptcy Games techniques. A classical bankruptcy problem arises from a situation in which some agents have claims on the available estate to be divided, such that each agent might receive a non-negative amount that cannot exceed its claim. The methodological approach described in this article is linked to Cooperative Games Theory and allows the evaluation of a sharing rule for goods that are not sufficient to satisfy the total requests of the users in the system. Moreover, a new criterion is developed that, in resource allocation, privileges those users with higher priority. Users’ willingness to pay is considered to define priority; the methodology can be considered innovative in this field of research. This approach has been applied in water resource systems using critical scarcity scenarios: initially, a simplified water system is used; then, the complex and multi-purpose Tirso-Flumendosa-Campidano water system in southern Sardinia, Italy, is examined. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Sechi & Riccardo Zucca, 2015. "Water Resource Allocation in Critical Scarcity Conditions: A Bankruptcy Game Approach," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 29(2), pages 541-555, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:29:y:2015:i:2:p:541-555
    DOI: 10.1007/s11269-014-0786-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Giovanni Sechi & Riccardo Zucca & Paola Zuddas, 2013. "Water Costs Allocation in Complex Systems Using a Cooperative Game Theory Approach," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 27(6), pages 1781-1796, April.
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    1. Mahdi Zarghami & Nasim Safari & Ferenc Szidarovszky & Shafiqul Islam, 2015. "Nonlinear Interval Parameter Programming Combined with Cooperative Games: a Tool for Addressing Uncertainty in Water Allocation Using Water Diplomacy Framework," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 29(12), pages 4285-4303, September.
    2. Jacob Rightnar & Ariel Dinar, 2020. "The Welfare Implications of Bankruptcy Allocation of the Colorado River Water: The Case of the Salton Sea Region," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 34(8), pages 2353-2370, June.
    3. Dan Yan & Saskia E. Werners & He Qing Huang & Fulco Ludwig, 2016. "Identifying and Assessing Robust Water Allocation Plans for Deltas Under Climate Change," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(14), pages 5421-5435, November.
    4. Emanuela Sassu & Riccardo Zucca & Giovanni M. Sechi, 2021. "Calibration Procedure of Regional Flow Duration Curves Evaluating Water Resource Withdrawal from Diversion Dams," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 35(4), pages 1135-1148, March.
    5. Sadegh Vanda & Mohammad Reza Nikoo & Narges Taravatrooy & Ghazi Ali Al-Rawas & Seyed M. K. Sadr & Fayyaz A. Memon & Banafsheh Nematollahi, 2023. "A Novel Compromise Approach for Risk-Based Selective Water Withdrawal from Reservoirs Considering Qualitative-Quantitative Aspects," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 37(12), pages 4861-4879, September.
    6. Carlos Gutiérrez-Martín & José A. Gómez-Limón & Nazaret M. Montilla-López, 2022. "Priority Water Rights for Irrigation at the River Basin Level. Do They Improve Economic Efficiency During Drought Periods?," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 36(10), pages 3737-3758, August.
    7. Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu & Weijun He, 2016. "Allocating Water under Bankruptcy Scenario," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(11), pages 3949-3964, September.
    8. Yang Zheng & Xuefeng Sang & Zhiwu Liu & Siqi Zhang & Pan Liu, 2022. "Water Allocation Management Under Scarcity: a Bankruptcy Approach," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 36(9), pages 2891-2912, July.

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