Public good and private good valuation for waiting time reduction: a laboratory study
AbstractIn a laboratory experiment subjects were endowed with money and waiting time. Preferences for waiting time reduction were elicited with salient rewards both as a private good and as a public good. The allocations of the public good that were theoretically predicted by the Nash equilibrium and the Lindahl equilibrium, respectively, were computed from the individual private good valuations and compared with the subjectsâ actual contributions. We found a significant positive correlation between private good valuations in terms of willingness-to-pay and public good valuations in terms of voluntary contributions. Group contributions to public waiting time reduction significantly exceeded the non-cooperative prediction and were close to the socially optimal level. However, for a majority of subjects, the Lindahl equilibrium was not able to predict the observed contributions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Tibor Neugebauer & Stefan Traub, 2011. "Public Good and Private Good Valuation for Waiting, Time Reduction: A Laboratory Study," LSF Research Working Paper Series 11-03, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Randall, Alan & Stoll, John R, 1980. "Consumer's Surplus in Commodity Space," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 449-55, June.
- repec:att:wimass:9006 is not listed on IDEAS
- Smith, Vernon L, 1980. "Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 584-99, September.
- Marks, Melanie & Croson, Rachel, 1998. "Alternative rebate rules in the provision of a threshold public good: An experimental investigation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 195-220, February.
- Andreoni, James, 1993.
"An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1317-27, December.
- Peter Bohm, 1972. "Estimating the demand for public goods: An experiment," Framed Field Experiments 00126, The Field Experiments Website.
- Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004.
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
- Johnson, F. Reed & Desvousges, William H., 1997. "Estimating Stated Preferences with Rated-Pair Data: Environmental, Health, and Employment Effects of Energy Programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 79-99, September.
- John List & Jason Shogren, 1998.
"Calibration of the difference between actual and hypothetical valuations in a field experiment,"
Natural Field Experiments
00296, The Field Experiments Website.
- List, John A. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Calibration of the difference between actual and hypothetical valuations in a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 193-205, October.
- Camerer, Colin F. & Hogarth, Robin M., 1999.
"The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework,"
1059, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
- Andreoni, James, 1995.
"Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-904, September.
- Eike B. Kroll & Bodo Vogt, 2009. "The St. Petersburg Paradox despite risk-seeking preferences: An experimental study," FEMM Working Papers 09004, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- R. Isaac & David Schmidtz & James Walker, 1989. "The assurance problem in a laboratory market," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 217-236, September.
- Lode Vereeck & Manuela MÃ¼hl, 2000. "An Economic Theory of Court Delay," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 243-268, November.
- Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 1998. "A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 297-323, November.
- Bohm, Peter, 1972. "Estimating demand for public goods: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 111-130.
- Hartman, John Lawrence, 2007. "The Relevance of Heterogeneity in a Congested Route Network with Tolls: An Analysis of Two Experiments Using Actual Waiting Times and Monetized Time Costs," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt22b46341, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.