IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/annopr/v186y2011i1p101-11810.1007-s10479-011-0893-4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A multi-period inventory model with multi-dimensional procurement bidding

Author

Listed:
  • Pooya Farahvash
  • Tayfur Altiok

Abstract

We consider a multi-period inventory model with raw material procurements carried out via a reverse auction. Bids are multi-dimensional, and they consist of supplier information of price, shortage quantity and lead time. This work is an extension of our earlier work that has focused on multi-dimensional procurement auctions in single-period inventory models, to multi-period settings. The new model is based on a hybrid approach combining stochastic dynamic programming and simulation. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Suggested Citation

  • Pooya Farahvash & Tayfur Altiok, 2011. "A multi-period inventory model with multi-dimensional procurement bidding," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 101-118, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:186:y:2011:i:1:p:101-118:10.1007/s10479-011-0893-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-011-0893-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10479-011-0893-4
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10479-011-0893-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    2. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter.
    3. Harvey M. Wagner & Thomson M. Whitin, 1958. "Dynamic Version of the Economic Lot Size Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(1), pages 89-96, October.
    4. Robert G. Hansen, 1988. "Auctions with Endogenous Quantity," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 44-58, Spring.
    5. David C. Parkes & Jayant Kalagnanam, 2005. "Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 435-451, March.
    6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-980, July.
    7. Garrett van Ryzin & Gustavo Vulcano, 2004. "Optimal Auctioning and Ordering in an Infinite Horizon Inventory-Pricing System," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 52(3), pages 346-367, June.
    8. Damian R. Beil & Lawrence M. Wein, 2003. "An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multiattribute RFQ Process," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(11), pages 1529-1545, November.
    9. Ravi Anupindi & Ram Akella, 1993. "Diversification Under Supply Uncertainty," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(8), pages 944-963, August.
    10. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Henry Inegbedion* & Sunday Eze & Abiola Asaleye & Adedoyin Lawal, 2019. "Inventory Management and Organisational Efficiency," The Journal of Social Sciences Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, vol. 5(3), pages 756-763, 03-2019.
    2. Qiu, Ruozhen & Sun, Minghe & Lim, Yun Fong, 2017. "Optimizing (s, S) policies for multi-period inventory models with demand distribution uncertainty: Robust dynamic programing approaches," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(3), pages 880-892.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pooya Farahvash & Tayfur Altiok, 2008. "Application of multi-dimensional procurement auction in single-period inventory models," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 229-251, November.
    2. Gérard P. Cachon & Fuqiang Zhang, 2006. "Procuring Fast Delivery: Sole Sourcing with Information Asymmetry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(6), pages 881-896, June.
    3. Antal-Pomázi, Krisztina, 2012. "Public Procurement as Auction – Theoretical Models and Practical Problems," Public Finance Quarterly, Corvinus University of Budapest, vol. 57(4), pages 381-393.
    4. Peter Bogetoft & Kurt Nielsen, 2002. "DEA Based Yardstick Competition in Natural Resource Management," CIE Discussion Papers 2002-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    5. Edieal J. Pinker & Abraham Seidmann & Yaniv Vakrat, 2003. "Managing Online Auctions: Current Business and Research Issues," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(11), pages 1457-1484, November.
    6. Xiaohu Qian & Shu-Cherng Fang & Min Huang & Qi An & Xingwei Wang, 2018. "Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 268(1), pages 293-313, September.
    7. Fangruo Chen, 2007. "Auctioning Supply Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(10), pages 1562-1576, October.
    8. Bogetoft, Peter & Nielsen, Kurt, 2008. "DEA based auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 184(2), pages 685-700, January.
    9. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2003. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 598-613, July.
    10. Brocas, Isabelle, 2014. "Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 22-33.
    11. Pinar Keskinocak & Shidhar Tayur, 2001. "Quantitative Analysis for Internet-Enabled Supply Chains," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 70-89, April.
    12. Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Yves Le Roux, 1995. "Politique européenne d'exportation de céréales et comportements des opérateurs : une analyse économétrique des adjudications de restitutions," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 117(1), pages 31-48.
    13. Onderstal, Sander, 2009. "Bidding for the unemployed: An application of mechanism design to welfare-to-work programs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 715-722, August.
    14. Pitchik, Carolyn, 2009. "Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 928-949, July.
    15. Guido Tatone, 2018. "La reputazione negli appalti pubblici: uno strumento socialmente desiderabile per risolvere il problema dello scadimento qualitativo," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2018(1), pages 59-85.
    16. Ghate, Archis, 2015. "Optimal minimum bids and inventory scrapping in sequential, single-unit, Vickrey auctions with demand learning," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 245(2), pages 555-570.
    17. Kashyap, Ravi, 2018. "Auction theory adaptations for real life applications," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(4), pages 452-481.
    18. Sundström, David, 2016. "The Competition Effect in a Public Procurement Model: An error-in-variables approach," Umeå Economic Studies 920, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 17 Jun 2016.
    19. Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Saša Pekeč, 2008. "Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 367-380, October.
    20. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:186:y:2011:i:1:p:101-118:10.1007/s10479-011-0893-4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.