(Over-)Stylizing Experimental Findings and Theorizing with Sweeping Generality
AbstractHuman decision making is a process guided by different and partly competing motivations that can each dominate behavior and lead to different effects depending on strength and circumstances. 'Over-stylizing' neglects such competing concerns and context-dependence, although it facilitates the emergence of elaborate general theories. We illustrate by examples from social dilemma experiments and inequality aversion theories that sweeping empirical claims should be avoided.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management in its journal Rationality, Markets and Morals.
Volume (Year): 0 (2009)
Issue (Month): 16 (November)
decision theory; social dilemmas; inequality aversion; behavioral economics; experimental economics;
Other versions of this item:
- Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & M. Vittoria Levatia, 2008. "(Over-)Stylizing experimental findings and theorizing with sweeping generality," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-092, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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